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I. INTRODUCTION
Lending money to plaintiffs to finance their lawsuits has become an
industry within the last ten years. Before the emergence of this industry,
little attention was paid to: 1) how injured plaintiffs managed financially
while waiting years for their cases to be resolved, and 2) the distinct
disadvantage suffered in the settlement and litigation processes by those
who could not afford to wait.1 The litigation financing firms make non-
recourse loans to plaintiffs in exchange for a share of the proceeds of
their lawsuits, if there are any. If a plaintiff loses, nothing is repaid, and
the lender loses the money advanced. One lender in the industry has
described his business as being "the Wild West of finance."2  This
description is apt because it is not clear how the law does control or
should control these transactions.3
The confounding factors affecting the industry are states'
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1. Diane E. Lewis, Accident Victims Get Money from "Advance Funders,"
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 2, 2003, at C1 (quoting Gerry Cohen, chairman of the Boston Bar
Association Ethics Committee).
2. Michael Pollick, Business & Money: Betting on the Verdict; Lawyers Advance
Plaintiffs Money to Keep Lawsuits Going, in Hopes of Cashing in if a Suit Succeeds,
SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Jan. 12, 2003, at Dl (quoting David Schechter, owner of
ExpressLawsuitFunding.com, a web site designed to offer financing to plaintiffs with
limited resources).
3. See, e.g. Susan Lorde Martin, Syndicated Lawsuits, Illegal Champerty or New
Business Opportunity?, 20 AM. Bus. L. J. 485, 488-89 (1992) (indicating that states'
approaches to champertous agreements are varied and sometimes unclear).
56 FORDHAMJOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. X
FINANCIAL LA W
prohibitions on champerty, state usury laws, consumer activist
opposition to predatory lending, and the ease with which Internet
businesses can be started.4 Anyone can put up a web site on the Internet
announcing that he or she will provide money to plaintiffs who cannot
pay their bills while their legal claims are being litigated. A plaintiff
may not mind that if he wins his lawsuit, he will have to repay the
principal advanced plus ten percent per month in interest because
without the loan, he would be forced to accept any settlement offer, no
matter how low.5  An upstate New York electrician provides an
example.6
Thomas Knauer suffered a serious brain injury when he fell off a
high ladder while installing electrical service.7 He and his wife were
besieged by creditors while they waited for their workers' compensation
case and other litigation to be resolved.8 The Knauers contacted a
litigation financing firm that advanced $13,500 to them which they
would repay with about fifty percent interest per year if, but only if, they
collected any money from the defendants or their insurance companies. 9
Mrs. Knauer was very pleased with this arrangement because she said
the $13,500 "made a huge difference in my life." 10
The legal issues surrounding the described transaction include
whether the agreement is an illegal violation of prohibitions against
champerty; whether the agreement is an illegal violation of usury
statutes; whether the lender is a predator taking advantage of an
unprotected borrower; and ultimately, whether the industry should be
left alone, regulated to some extent, or regulated out of business.
This article will provide a brief background on the issues of
champerty and usury and will then focus on recent state court decisions
about the enforceability of litigation financing agreements. The article
then looks at subprime lending in general to determine if litigation
financing belongs in the general category considered "predatory."
Finally, the article concludes that litigation financing firms can provide a
worthwhile service to level the playing field in lawsuits when defendants
4. See Lewis, supra note 1, at C1.
5. See Pollick, supra note 2, at D1.
6, Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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have much greater resources available than plaintiffs, but such firms
must be regulated to force meaningful disclosure of the terms of the
financing agreement so that borrowers can choose the firm that offers
the best deal. Furthermore, the government, rather than eliminating
litigation financing firms, should encourage traditional lenders to enter
the industry to bring competitive market forces to bear on the rates
charged to plaintiffs for the financing.
II. CHAMPERTY AND USURY PROHIBITIONS: THE HINDRANCES TO
LITIGATION FINANCING
Champerty, an arrangement in which a third party supports
another's litigation in exchange for a share of the proceeds if there are
any, has been prohibited by law since ancient times." The reasons for
the prohibition have included a desire to discourage frivolous litigation,
quarrels, resistance to settlement, and interference with the attorney-
client relationship.' 2 Nevertheless, in the United States, even in states
that have maintained the prohibition against champerty in general, there
have always been exceptions to the prohibition. 3 The most widespread
is the universal use of the lawyer's contingency fee.' 4 The contingency
fee became accepted because allowing an impoverished plaintiff to bring
a legitimate cause of action was viewed as more important than
preventing the alleged evils of champerty which could, in any case, be
eliminated by rigorous supervision by the courts. 5
Furthermore, over the years, common law in many states has
eliminated the prohibition on champerty or has found in a variety of
circumstances insufficient reason to enforce it.' 6 Most notably, New
Jersey has always permitted and enforced champertous agreements;
17
11. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 3 at 485-88; Max Radin, Maintenance by
Champerty, 24 CAL. L. REV. 48, 51-52 (1935).
12. A.L.G., Note, The Effect of Champerty in Contractual Liability, 79 L. Q. REV.
493, 494 (1963).
13. See, e.g., Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Plaintiffs' Lawsuits: An Increasingly
Popular (and Legal) Business, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 57, 59-71 (2000).
14. See Martin, supra note 3, at 490.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 13, at 87.
17. See, Weller v. Jersey City H & P St. Ry. Co., 57 A. 730, 732 (N.J. Ch. 1904)
(holding that maintenance and champerty never prevailed in New Jersey).
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and in 1997 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the state
would no longer recognize the prohibition on champertous agreements.18
Outside the United States, other common law countries have
increasingly been relaxing prohibitions on champerty. 9
The chance that the lenders would not get their principal and fees if
the financed plaintiff won or that the plaintiff's case would be dismissed
because of the champertous third party financing, was the main deterrent
to making these arrangements. When court opinions refusing to enforce
the champerty prohibition started to appear, at the same time that
reaching customers on the Internet became an easy and efficient way to
conduct business, the circumstances were ripe for an explosion of
litigation financing firms.20
The other chief potential legal impediment to this new industry
were usury statutes.2 ' Usury, the act of lending money at an unlawfully
high rate of interest, is another ancient legal doctrine. 2 The world's first
recorded usury law, setting a maximum allowable interest rate cap, was
part of the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi written in 1750 B.C.E.2 3 It
limited rates to about twenty percent per year for loans on silver and
24thirty-three percent per year for loans on grain.
Today, most states in the United States have statutes setting interest
rate limits and prohibiting usury. In most states, the elements of usury
are: (1) an agreement to lend money; (2) the borrower's absolute
obligation to repay with repayment not contingent on any other event or
18. Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1224 (Mass. 1997).
19. See Martin, supra note 13, at 72-79.
20. See, e.g., Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 682-83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(discussing the decreased need for strict prohibitions on champerty); Osprey, Inc. v.
Cabana Ltd. Partnership, 532 S.E.2d 269, 382 (S.C. 2000) (abolishing champerty as a
defense and expressing confidence that other more well-developed principles of law can
accomplish the same goals).
21. See, e.g., Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Litigation On-Line: Usury and Other
Obstacles, 1 DEPAUL Bus. & COMMERCIAL L.J. 85, 89-90 (2002) (discussing how usury
has emerged as a significant barrier for litigation financing firms).
22. Id. at 89.
23. Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Consumer
Credit: The Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REv. 807, 820-21
(2003).
24. Id. at 821.
25. See Martin, supra note 21, at 90 n.39 (listing state usury statutes and noting the
repeal of the Idaho statute).
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circumstance; (3) a greater compensation for making the loan than is
allowed under a usury statute or the State Constitution; and (4) an
intention to take more for the loan of the money than the law allows. 26 It
is the second element that is arguably missing in the typical litigation
financing agreement because the borrower's obligation to repay is
contingent on the borrower's success in the litigation.
III. THE OHIO SUPREME COURT WOUNDS THE LITIGATION FINANCING
INDUSTRY: RANCMAN V. INTERIM SETTLEMENT FUNDING CORPORATION
Roberta Rancman was seriously injured when she was a passenger
27in a car. She sued State Farm Insurance Company for benefits under
an uninsured motorist policy issued to her husband from whom she was
separated.28 Shortly after filing suit, Rancman entered into an agreement
with Future Settlement Funding Corporation (FSF) in which FSF agreed
to give her $6,000 in exchange for her promise to give FSF $16,800 if
her case were resolved within twelve months, $22,200 if the case were
resolved within eighteen months, or $27,600 if it were resolved within
twenty-four months.29 She entered into a second agreement with Interim
Settlement Funding Corporation (ISF) in which ISF agreed to give her
$1000 in exchange for her promise to pay $2,800 from the proceeds of
her case.30 If Rancman did not recover anything from State Farm she
would not have to pay anything to FSF or ISF; she would keep the funds
they had advanced to her.31
Rancman settled her case with State Farm for $100,000 within
twelve months of her agreement with FSF.32 Instead of paying FSF
$16,800 and ISF $2,800 as required by her agreements, Rancman
returned the $6,000 and $1,000 advanced with eight percent interest per
26. See, e.g., Ives v. W.T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749, 762 (2d Cir. 1975)
(Connecticut law); Dopp v. Yari, 927 F. Supp. 814, 820 (D.N.J. 1996) (New Jersey
law); In re Maryvale County. Hosp., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 304, 308-09 (D. Ariz. 1969)
(Arizona law).
27. Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217, 218 (Ohio
2003).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 218-19.
30. Id. at 219.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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year, and she sued FSF and ISF for a rescission of the contracts and a
declaratory judgment that the contracts were "unfair, deceptive, and
unconscionable sales practices."33 A magistrate, the trial court, and the
intermediate appellate court in Ohio held that Rancman's transactions
with FSF and ISF were loans.34 The appellate court reasoned that there
was no real probability that State Farm would not pay Rancman and,
therefore, the agreements were loans because there was no
contingency. 5 The court's holding meant that FSF and ISF could not
collect anything from Rancman, neither interest, nor principal, nor any
other fees.36
FSF and ISF appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court which declined to
decide whether the money they advanced to Rancman were loans or
investments, noting that there was no legal limit on a return on
investments.37  Instead, the court returned to the old champerty
prohibition, declaring the agreements void because they were
champertous.38 The court thus achieved the same result as the lower
courts, but it, sua sponte, used entirely different reasoning and arrived at
an entirely different legal conclusion.39
The court gave a brief history of champerty in Ohio, citing cases
from 1823,40 1902,41 and 190842 to assert that champerty has always
been "vilified" in Ohio.43 The court, nevertheless, admitted that in
recent years champerty has "lain dormant in Ohio courts. ' 44  It is
interesting to speculate why the court resurrected this doctrine when
none of the parties in the case requested it.4 5 First, one might assume
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., No. 20523, 2001 WL 1339487,
at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2001).
36. Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 219.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 221.
40. Key v. Vattier, 1 Ohio 132 (Ohio 1823).
41. Brown v. Ginn, 64 N.E. 123 (Ohio 1902).
42. Davy v. Fid. & Cas. Ins. Co., 85 N.E. 504 (Ohio 1908).
43. Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 220.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 221 (noting in concurrence that because neither party addressed the issue
of champerty, Judge Christley would have preferred allowing them the opportunity to
submit additional briefs on the subject).
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that because Rancman would have had to pay an, arguably, very high
rate of return on the money advanced to her, the court wanted to affirm
the lower courts' result.46  A visceral reaction to the terms of the
agreements might assume a poor, unprotected plaintiff being taken
advantage of by sophisticated, well-financed, wise-guy lenders. If that
were the court's mind-set, it could have just affirmed the appellate
court's decision that the transaction was a loan and declared it usurious.
The lower court's reasoning was problematic, however.47 It required the
conclusion that there was no possibility that Rancman would fail to
collect from State Farm either in litigation or in a settlement. If there
was a contingency, then the money advanced was an investment, not a
loan, and there could be no usury. The Ohio Supreme Court clearly did
not want to undertake the determination of "the threshold level of risk
necessary for a contingent advance to be treated as an investment rather
than a loan."48 It avoided making that determination by choosing to
invoke the prohibition on champerty instead.49
The court focused on Rancman's disincentive to settle the case
because of her agreements with FSF and ISF.50 For example, the $7,000
in advances made it unreasonable for Rancman to settle for $28,000 or
less." She would have had to pay FSF $16,800 and ISF $2,800 and a
thirty percent contingency fee to her lawyer.5 With no other liens, she
would not have received any additional money unless the settlement was
for more than $28,000.: Thus, the court concluded that the financing
arrangements could prolong litigation and reduce incentives to settle,
evils the prohibition against champerty is supposed to cure. 4 The court
did not consider the pressure on the plaintiff to settle her case for an
46. Id. at 218-19 (noting that the contracted annual rate of return exceeded 190
percent).
47. See Rancman, 2001 WL 1339487, at *3 (finding that the contracts were loans
because there was no real probability of non-payment).
48. Rancman, 789 N.E.2d. at 219.
49. Id.
50. Id. (indicating that the advances were void as champerty, regardless of whether
they constituted loans or investments).
51. Id. at 220.
52. Id. at 220 (demonstrating that Rancman would be left with nothing after paying
off the advances and the lawyer's fees).
53. Id. at 221 (indicating that the terms of the agreements "effectively bars her
from considering a settlement offer of up to $28,000").
54. See, e.g., id. (referring specifically to maintenance).
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unfairly low offer by the defendant if the plaintiff had no money to pay
her living expenses while she waited for the proceeds from her case.55
The court was also disturbed by "a champertor's earning a
handsome profit by speculating in a lawsuit" and by the possibility that a
party would be manipulated.5 6 In this case there was no evidence that
Rancman was manipulated.57 Rancman testified that she knew the terms
of the agreements.58 Furthermore, she had an attorney, and she
specifically rejected his advice not to enter into the agreements. 59 The
court clearly did not like the financial arrangement that was at issue in
this case and was determined to declare it void.60 Unfortunately, it did
not perform a well-reasoned analysis of its concerns about the financing
arrangement, namely: the effect on litigation, the disadvantage of the
financed party, and the amount of money earned by the lenders.61
Ohio is not the only state that has recently affirmed its common law
champerty prohibition. A Nevada District Court did so in Resolution
Settlement Corp. v. Curry.62 Curry contacted Resolution Settlement
Corporation (RSC) seeking financing to fund an appeal from a jury
verdict in her favor.63 RSC had discussions with Curry and her attorney,
and then provided two advances pursuant to Curry's requests on two
separate occasions. 64 Each time, Curry executed an agreement that
provided that RSC would get paid only if Curry won the underlying case
and there were sufficient funds to pay attorney's fees, costs, and any
"prior superior" liens first.65 Curry agreed that if she won her case she
55. See generally, id. (failing to discuss any extraneous factors that might induce
the plaintiff to settle).
56. Id. at 221 (noting that the FSF agreement explicitly indicated that FSF should
make a substantial profit).
57. Id. at 218, 221.
58. Rancman, 2001 WL 1339487, at *3.
59. Id. at *l.
60. See Raneman, 789 N.E.2d. at 219. ("The advances made to Rancman
constituted champerty and maintenance. Consequently, the contracts requiring their
repayment are void and shall not be enforced." (quoting Gen Film Co. v. Sampliner,
232 F. 95, 99 (C.A.6 1916))).
61. See generally, id. at 220-21 (describing narrowly the negative effects that the
advances create while failing to mention the positives these arrangements might serve).
62. No. 01-A-435557-C, slip op. (Nev. Dist. Ct. Jan. 24, 2003).
63. Id. at 1.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2.
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would pay RSC twenty-five percent or $1.2 million, whichever was
greater, of the funds recovered.66 Curry won and refused to pay RSC.67
RSF sued to recover under its contract or in quantum meruit and lost.
68
The court noted that other states had eliminated prohibitions on
champerty, but asserted that Nevada had not, citing several Nevada
Supreme Court holdings.69
While Curry is an example of a court merely following a long-held
precedent, the Rancman case is an excellent example of the more
emotional problems faced by the litigation financing industry: courts just
do not like it. There is something unseemly about investors making
money by betting on the outcome of litigation; investors making a lot of
money for risk that sometimes may be limited; and investors making
money in circumstances involving people who do not have any. All
these factors make litigation financing seem like just another example of
predatory lending.
IV. PREDATORY LENDING AND SUBPRIME LENDING
Many commentators have written about high-cost lending by
predatory lenders.7° Their purpose is generally to sympathize with and
66. But see, Michael Blum, Standards and Practices for Attorneys with Clients
Considering Litigation Funding (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(noting that the more reputable litigation financing firms base their fees on the amount
of money advanced, not on a percentage of the recovery). Mr. Blum is the CEO of
LawFinance Group, Inc., a litigation financing firm in San Francisco.
67. Curry, No. 01-A-435557-C, slip op. at 2 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Jan. 24, 2003).
68. Id. at 5.
69. Id. at 3-5 (citing Schwartz v. Eliades, 113 Nev. 586 (1997); Lum v. Stinnett, 87
Nev. 402 (1971); Martinez v. Johnson, 61 Nev. 125 (1941)).
70. See, e.g., Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer
Financial Services Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to
Current Thinking about the Role of Usury Laws in Today's Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589
(200); Deborah Goldstein, Note, Protecting Consumers from Predatory Lenders:
Defining the Problem and Moving Towards Workable Solutions, 35 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 225 (2000); Kathleen E. Keest, et al., Interest Rate Regulation Developments:
High-Cost Mortgages, Rent-to-Own Transactions, and Unconscionability, 50 Bus.
LAW. 1081 (1995); Peterson, supra note 23; Scott Andrew Schaaf, Note, From Checks
to Cash: The Regulation of the Payday Lending Industry, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 339
(2001); Kimm Tynan, Symposium: The Osceola, Note, Pennsylvania Welcomes
Predatory Lenders: Pennsylvania's Act 55 Preempts Philadelphia's Tough Ordinance
but Provides Little Protection for Vulnerable Borrowers, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 837 (2003).
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reform the plight of "low-income communities, racial and ethnic
minorities, women, the undereducated, and the elderly" who are the
victims of predatory practices. 71 Although there is no legal definition of
predatory lending, 2 the term usually refers to situations in which
borrowers do not understand the terms of the loan and all material
information is not disclosed to them; lenders put undue pressure on
borrowers knowing that borrowers have insufficient resources to make
loan payments; and lenders target vulnerable borrowers. 73  Generally,
predatory practices do not occur in the prime lending market because
there is greater competition among banks, thrifts, and credit unions
which are, in addition, heavily regulated by state and federal agencies.74
Furthermore, prime borrowers are more likely to understand the
financial transactions and to shop around for the best terms.75
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
recounted the following example of predatory lending. A seventy-one
year old woman was visited by a mortgage broker who promised that he
could refinance her existing mortgages so that her monthly payments
would be less and she would receive an extra $5,000 in cash with which
she could make the kitchen repairs she needed.76 His friendly manner
earned her trust and persuaded her to sign the loan documents although
she could not read them because of poor vision and limited education.77
The result was that her monthly payment increased to eighty percent of
her monthly income, she received no cash, and the broker received
71. Tynan, supra note 70, at 840.
72. U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Development, Curbing Predatory Home
Mortgage Lending, June 2000, updated Mar. 18, 2003, at 17, available at
http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf [hereinafter HUD].
73. Shimon A. Berger, Note, Adding Insult to Injury: How In Re Venture Mortgage
Fund Exposes the Inequitable Results of New York's Usury Remedies, 29 FORDHAM
URBAN L.J. 2193, 2194 n.13 (2002); see also Freddie Mac, Anti-Predatory Lending
(2004) (defining predatory lending as "any practice in which lenders try to fool or
intimidate consumers into agreeing to assume loans that are ultimately unaffordable and
do not meet industry standards"), available at
http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/initiatives/protection/predlend.html.
74. See HUD, supra note 72 at 2.
75. See id. at 51 ("A subprime borrower may have few financial options available
or less information on loan terms and conditions and less opportunity to shop for the
best terms and conditions available.").
76. See id. at 18.
77. Id.
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$9,100 as a fee.78  Such stories abound in the predatory lending
literature, but they are far older than the recent interest of consumer
advocates. They were the original reasons for ancient usury laws:
Such usury laws are intended as a bulwark to protect the needy from
the greed of the rapacious. It is the theory of such enactments that
those in distress might be plunged into deeper distress if the law did
not come to their relief and protect them from the money lender, who
would prey upon misfortune and wring from the needy borrower, in
his endeavor to tide over present difficulty, the utmost farthing as
compensation for what is often an evanescent benefit-merely the
putting off of an evil day.
79
Such stories should not lead, however, to the conclusion that all
subprime lending is predatory. Subprime lending is generally defined as
"the extension of credit to higher-risk borrowers who do not qualify for
traditional, prime credit[, m]ost often [because of] borrowers' tarnished
credit records or uncertain income prospects.... Subprime loans
naturally feature pricing and other contract terms that either compensate
for or are intended to lessen some of these risks. 8 ° In the last ten years
subprime lending has increased dramatically because of credit assessing
tools that have allowed lenders to institute more profitable risk-based
pricing. 81 For example, the subprime auto finance market has increased
from about $15 billion in loans in 1992 to between $65 billion and $125
billion in 2002.82 During that same time period subprime lenders helped
78. See id. at 19.
79. In re Washer, 248 P. 1068, 1073 (Cal. App. 1926); see also Rogus v.
Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 281 N.E.2d 346, 348 (Ill. App.
1972) ("obvious general purpose of the usury statute is to protect the necessitous
borrower from an unscrupulous lender"); Schneider v. Phelps, 391 N.Y.S.2d 568, 572
(1977) (Judge Jasen referring to the purpose of usury laws "in almost all civilizations,"
"from time immemorial" as "recogniz[ing] that the crush of financial burdens causes
people to agree to almost any conditions of the lender and to consent to even the most
improvident loans").
80. Edward M. Gramlich, Federal Reserve Board Governor, Remarks at the Texas
Association of Bank Counsel 2 7th Annual Convention, Oct. 9, 2003, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/Speeches/2003/20031009/default.htm.
81. Joseph A. Smith, Jr., Financial Literacy, Regulation and Consumer Welfare, 8
N.C. BANKING INST. 77, 80 (2004).
82. Anne Kim, Progressive Policy Institute, Taken for a Ride: Subprime Lenders,
Automobility, and the Working Poor (Nov. 2002), at 1, available at
www.ppionline.org/ppici.cfm?contentid=251014&knlgAreaID=l 14&subsecid=1 43.
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increase minority home ownership to record levels by opening the home
mortgage market to low-income and minority borrowers.8 3 By 2002,
subprime mortgage originations were 8.6% of all mortgage originations
in the United States. 84 Between 2002 and 2003, the total volume of
subprime lending increased by more than 50%, from $213 billion to
$332 billion.85
When the subprime market operates efficiently, it provides
opportunities for low-income borrowers to buy homes, cars and other
goods by obtaining credit that is unavailable to them in the prime
market. Most commentators on credit issues, critics and lenders alike,
agree that credit should be available to as many borrowers as possible.86
However, there is disagreement about how well the subprime market is
working and how it should be regulated because there is little empirical
evidence about these questions.8 Subprime lenders argue that they
charge more because they are assuming greater risk. Low-income
borrowers are, in fact, more likely to default on loan payments.88
Consumer advocates argue that not all low-income borrowers default,
and new risk assessment technologies allow lenders to distinguish the
good risks from the bad ones.89 One academic expert has noted the
misconceptions that exist about subprime borrowers: anecdotal evidence
that they are primarily poor or old 90 when an examination of relevant
83. Id. at lO
84. Hearing on Subprime Lending Before the Subcomm. on Financial Inst. and
Consumer Credit of the House Financial Serv. Comm., 108 t" Cong. (2004) (statement of
Prof. Michael E. Staten, Professor of Management and Director of the Credit Research
Center at the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University) available at
2004 WL 740914 (F.D.C.H.) [hereinafter Hearing].
85. Joint Hearing on Subprime Lending: Defining the Market and Its Customers
Before the Subcomm. on Financial Inst. and Consumer Credit and the Subcomm. on
Housing and Community Opportunity of the House Financial Serv. Comm., 108"' Cong.
(2004) (statement of Eric Stein, Senior Vice President for the Center for Responsible
Lending, a non-profit research and public policy organization that is an affiliate of Self-
Help, a non-profit lender to borrowers who do not qualify for loans at traditional
institutions) available at 2004 WL 740926 (F.D.C.H.) [hereinafter Joint Hearing].
86. Hearing, supra note 84.
87. Id.
88. Kim, supra note 82, at 10-11.
89. Id. at 12.
90. See Hearing on Predatory Lending Before the Senate Special Aging Comm.,
108"h Cong. (2004) (statement of Gavin Gee, Director of Idaho Dept. of Finance,
asserting the harm that predatory lending does to the elderly and the "unbanked")
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databases shows they are primarily of moderate income and relatively
young." Furthermore, analysis of subprime mortgage databases
indicates that the marketplace is efficient because subprime mortgage
prices are closely correlated with more delinquencies and foreclosures.92
V. TAMING THE WILD WEST OF FINANCE
Litigation financing, such as the arrangements made by Ms.
Rancman, is certainly within the category of subprime lending in that
generally the borrowers do not qualify for traditional, prime credit, and
the financing firms compensate in their rate of return for the risk of
extending credit on the basis of only the borrower's interest in the
outcome of a case in litigation. 93 Litigation financing does not, however,
satisfy the general descriptions of predatory lending in that generally the
borrowers are not being intimidated or fooled, and they have
professionals to help them understand the terms of the financing. The
reason these borrowers are in a different position from other subprime
borrowers is that, almost by definition, people seeking funds to pay their
living expenses while they await the outcome of their lawsuits, have
lawyers who are already familiar with the circumstances in which their
clients find themselves. These borrowers do not have to seek out legal
help with their agreements with litigation financing firms; the lawyers
they already have are going to be involved automatically, and they will
have an ethical obligation to provide advice to their clients about the
financing. The financing firm will contact the borrower's lawyer to
make sure that it has all the information about the case so that it can
assess its risk and so that the lawyer will keep it informed about the
progress of the case and its outcome.
available at 2004 WL 349616 (F.D.C.H.).
91. Hearing, supra note 84.
92. Id.
93. Litigation financing has also been sought by a variety of businesses. Large,
well-capitalized firms have made the business decision that they would rather have a
partner share the expenses of the litigation and receive money upfront from that partner
in exchange for a share of the proceeds of the litigation which may not materialize for
several years. Small firms without resources have attempted to syndicate their lawsuits
so that they would have the money to pursue the litigation in exchange, again, for a
share of the proceeds of the litigation, if there eventually are any. This article is
focusing on consumers who are targeted by on-line litigation financing firms.
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Nevertheless, merely having access to legal advice does not
necessarily* protect buyers from litigation financing firms that may be
charging too much. Ms. Rancman, for example, rejected her lawyer's
advice and contracted for funds at 180% and 280% rates. Perhaps she
was making a rational decision that without the advanced funds she
would have to accept the insurer's low settlement offer; with the funds,
she would have the wherewithal to wait for a better offer and wind up
with more money even after paying the financing company its agreed-
upon rate. The problem is knowing whether the 180% and 280% rates
are really too high.
It would be bad policy and unfair to poor plaintiffs with good cases
to regulate litigation financing firms out of business. Consumer
advocates have noted that very restrictive anti-predatory lending laws
that set low limits on interest rates may, instead of protecting subprime
borrowers, actually disadvantage them further by reducing their
options.94 Nonetheless, there are a number of steps that Congress and
state legislatures could take to protect choices available to plaintiffs with
limited financial resources.
A. Truth in Lending
The most obvious kind of regulation that would provide some
protection for plaintiffs seeking litigation financing is a disclosure
requirement. Some consumer advocates have dismissed disclosure
requirements as merely providing a defense for unscrupulous lenders; 95
however, given that the plaintiffs/borrowers have legal counsel to advise
them in using financial information, disclosure of easily comparable
rates would certainly help them choose the litigation financing firm that
offered the best deal.
The goals of the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA) to strengthen
competition among firms extending credit by the informed use of credit
and to enable their customers to compare more easily the credit terms
available 96 are certainly worthy goals for the regulation of the litigation
94. See Kim, supra note 82 at 2.
95. See, e.g., Joint Hearing, supra note 85 (noting that with the large amount of
paper work, disclosures do little real good because they are often overlooked by
borrowers, yet serve to protect lenders).
96. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2004).
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financing industry. The industry, however, is not covered by TILA
because litigation financing firms are not "creditors" within the meaning
of the Act.97 A "creditor" must inter alia regularly extend consumer
credit.98  "Credit" must involve the deferred payment of a "debt.
99
Generally, for a transfer of money to qualify as a "debt," the "repayment
of the purported debt cannot be contingent upon a future event.' ' 00 The
repayment of money advanced by litigation financing firms is clearly
contingent upon the plaintiffs success in the litigation. If the plaintiff
loses, he or she keeps the money advanced by the litigation financing
firm.
TILA could, however, be amended to include litigation financing
firms. One way to do that would be to liberalize the meaning of "debt"
to include contingent obligations when funds are advanced to support
litigation. There is precedent for varying the definition of "debt"
depending on the context in which it is used and, under some conditions,
to define it broadly enough to include contingent obligations. 10' In
addition, TILA's exemption for credit transactions exceeding $25,000102
would have to be amended because there would be no justification for
failing to provide financing information to plaintiffs with lawsuits
valued high enough to justify financing firms extending more than that
amount.
Protection under TILA provides plaintiffs/borrowers conspicuous
disclosure of finance charges and annual percentage rates calculated in a
uniform way. 103 Any advertising, including Internet advertising, which
is an important method for litigation financing firms appealing to
customers, would have to set forth clearly and conspicuously the cost of
97. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (2004).
98. Id.
99. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(e) (2004).
100. In Re Trumpeter, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 1653, 1666 (1998); see also Kizer v.
Hanna, 255 Cal. Rptr. 412, 417 (1989) (en banc) (noting a "debt" that holds that "a sum
payable upon some contingency is not a debt until the contingency occurs"); 8
MEHRTENS LAW OF FED. INCOME TAX'N § 30:15 (2004) (indicating that "[e]very debt
must be certain and in all events payable. Whenever it is uncertain whether anything
will ever be demanded by virtue of the contract, it cannot be called a "debt," because
debt is a liquidated demand...).
101. See, e.g., UMF Sys., Inc. V. Eltra Corp. 17 Cal. 3d 753, 756-57 (1976)
(discussing the various legal definitions the word "debt" may take on).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 1603(3) (2004).
103. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1606, 1632 (2004).
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the funds advanced.'04 Such disclosure would enable
plaintiffs/borrowers to understand more easily what their cash advances
would actually cost them if they did receive awards from their litigation,
and it would enable them to shop around for the most favorable offer
and to bargain for fee reductions.
B. Promoting Competition
Consumer advocates have argued that instead of regulating
subprime lenders out of business, the government should try to
encourage traditional lenders to enter the subprime business.10 5 One
reason these advocates give for traditional lenders' reluctance to enter
the subprime market is the unsavory reputation of the subprime
industry.10 6  That problem certainly exists in the litigation financing
world.10 7 An example is Perry Walton who turned to the litigation
finance business after he was convicted for extortionate collection of
debt in 1997, ending his career in personal finance. 0 8  He then
conducted seminars training people to set up litigation finance firms,
reportedly charging more than $12,000 for a two-day program.1°9
Recently, Walton boasted to reporters, "Pretty much everybody who got
their start in the industry got it from me."" 0 His involvement in a case
heard in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina"' typifies the kind of behavior that has besmirched the entire
industry.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 1663 (2004).
105. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 82 at 13 (discussing the effect that encouraging
"mainstream" lenders to enter the subprime market would have on those looking to
purchase a car who need financing).
106. See, e.g., id. (explaining why some "mainstream" lenders have not yet entered
the subprime market).
107. Gary Young, Two Setbacks for Lawsuit Financing but the Practice is Still Alive
and Well, NAT'L L.J., July 28, 2003, at 2 ("The industry's legal troubles have often been
the fault of unscrupulous dealers.").
108. Id.
109. Gary Young, Sabotaged? Law Firm Sues Litigation-Finance Company in Case
Involving Owner of Charlotte Hornets, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REv., Jan. 4, 2002, at 11.
110. Young, supra note 107.
111. Weaver, Bennett & Bland, P.A. v. Speedy Bucks, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 448
(W.D.N.C. 2001).
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In Weaver, Bennett & Bland, P.A. v. Speedy Bucks, Inc., 1 2 the
Weaver law firm represented a client who did not have the financial
resources to fund the litigation against George Shinn, the owner of the
Charlotte Hornets National Basketball Association team." 3 Weaver
received a solicitation from Walton's litigation financing business; the
two met and signed a confidentiality agreement respecting the client's
case.1 4  According to Weaver's complaint, Weaver decided the
financing arrangement was not legal under either North Carolina or
South Carolina law (the two states involved) and declined to participate,
whereupon Walton began dealing directly with the client unbeknownst
to Weaver. 15 Walton entered into a contract with the client, providing
$200,000 to her in exchange for a percentage of her recovery in the suit
with a minimum repayment of $600,000 if she were to win.1 16 Weaver
and the judge presiding over the case against Shinn were confused when
the client was adamant about not accepting Shinn's settlement offer of
$1,000,000 and would not accept anything less than $1,200,000. 17
Weaver explained that anything less than $1,200,000 would have
resulted in a loss for the client because of her agreement with Walton." 8
The Weaver judge observed, "[i]n a twist perhaps unique in law, a court
loss resulting in no award of damages was better for the client than a
million dollar settlement."" 9 The client ultimately lost in a jury trial, 20
nevertheless keeping the $200,000 extended to her by the Walton
firms.12' Weaver then sued the Walton firms for tortious interference
with contract, fraud, and unfair and deceptive trade practices, winning a
total of $521,225 in ajury trial. 122
Representatives of litigation finance firms assert that Walton's
actions are an anomaly; that unscrupulous dealers are not inherent to the
industry; and that reputable firms deal directly and closely with
112. Id.
113. Id. at 450.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 451.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Young, supra note 109.
122. Young, supra note 109 at 1.
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plaintiffs/borrowers' attorneys. 23  Similar arguments are made by
subprime lenders in automobile loan and home mortgage loan
businesses as well as by advocates for low-income borrowers.
24
One way to encourage honest litigation financing firms and to
promote competition from more traditional lenders would be to collect
information about the industry from the firms in it. 125  Reporting
requirements would make data available so that assessments could be
made about the profitability of the industry and its fair
lending/advancing practices. In fact, some litigation financing
companies are becoming more transparent in an effort to become more
mainstream, and some traditional lenders are getting into the more risky
business of supporting litigation.
C. Litigation Financing in the Mainstream
Although traditional banks are not extending funds to litigants
making repayment contingent on the litigants' success in their cases,
some have started opening lines of credit for lawyers supported by cases
they have taken on a contingency fee basis. 126 Sunwest Bank of Tustin
in Orange County, California has targeted law firms that take cases on a
contingency basis because lawyers in southern California are well
known for winning huge awards from juries. 127  Not only do these
lawyers repay their lines of credit, but they put the proceeds of these
cases in the bank, and they refer clients to the bank. 128 In addition,
banks can charge contingency-fee lawyers higher rates because the
business is riskier, banks can require personal guarantees or lawyers'
personal residences as collateral, and the banks may require the lawyers
to provide a monthly list of cases and expenses. 129 Other banks in
Oregon, Tennessee, and Louisiana also view these lawyers as a unique
123. Id.
124. See Kim, supra note 82 at 13 (discussing how mainstream lenders in the
subprime market can better manage the risk of low income borrowers).
125. See, e.g., id. at 14 (making same argument for subprime automobile financing
industry).
126. Katie Kuehner-Hebert, A Few Banks Betting on Lawyers' Winning Ways, AM.
BANKER, Jan. 3, 2002, at 6A.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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opportunity to make money in the financing business because there is
little competition. 13
0
Litigation finance firms, on the other hand, are making attempts to
institutionalize their industry, to improve their image by being more
forthcoming on the rates they are charging, to keep those rates closer to
credit card rates, and to become more involved in their communities. 3'
For example, LawCash, a Brooklyn, New York-based company started
in 2000 by two former health care industry financiers, has adopted lower
interest rates and invites community endorsements. 32 Its annual interest
rates ranged between sixteen and forty-eight percent when the average
annual percentage rate charged by credit card companies was about
fifteen percent.'33 In 2001 and 2002, it advanced more than $10 million
to more than 1,300 people, and it lost its advance on only about four
percent of the cases.' 34 It will advance up to ten percent of its estimate
of the eventual recovery in the case up to $100,000.13' The director of
the Brooklyn-based Association of Community Organizations for
Reform Now (ACORN), a consumer advocacy group for low and
moderate income families, started referring her organization's clients to
LawCash. 136
LawFunds LLC, a Salem, Massachusetts litigation finance firm,
will deal only directly with the plaintiff/borrower's attorney. 137  That
commitment eliminates the possibility of cases like Weaver, Bennett &
Bland, P.A. v. Speedy Bucks, Inc. 138 which diminish the reputation of the
industry. Michael Blum, the chief executive officer of LawFinance
Group, Inc., a San Francisco-based litigation finance firm, has
developed guidelines for lawyers to evaluate litigation financing firms
so that the lawyers can protect clients seeking outside funding while
130. Id.
131. Cristina Merrill, Judgment Call: Firms that Lend to Personal-Injury Plaintiffs
Take Steps to Improve Their Bad-Guy Image, CRAIN's N.Y. Bus., Jan. 27, 2003, at 1
(noting that LawCash lends to personal injury plaintiffs at lower interest rates).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Diane E. Lewis, With Interest: Accident Victims Get Money from "Advance
Funders, "BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 2, 2003, at C1.
136. Id.
137. See Young, supra note 109 at 11.
138. See Weaver, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 451.
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their lawsuits are pending.'39 His recommendations emphasize the
importance of the lawyer's diligent and loyal representation of the client
in both the underlying litigation and the transactions with the litigation
financing firm; the client's informed decision to enter into the litigation
financing agreement after all financial terms have been disclosed; and
the financing firm's distance from the conduct of the client's underlying
case. 140
There is little doubt that a litigation financing industry that acts
professionally and ethically in attempting to earn a reasonable return for
the risk it is undertaking, fills a need that has not been served by more
traditional lenders. The industry can be improved by some regulation,
but it would be unfortunate if the entire industry became the victim of a
political movement of so-called tort reform that dwells on the outlier
cases in which plaintiffs receive unwarranted windfalls but ignores the
much more numerous situations where fairness and justice are absent
because meritorious plaintiffs do not have the funds to sustain routine
expenses as well as medical costs during the years that it may take to
bring their cases to a final conclusion. One of the most famous
customers of litigation financing was probably Abner Louima, the
Haitian immigrant who brought a highly publicized case of police
brutality against the New York City Police Department. 141 Three years
after the start of his lawsuit, Louima still had not received any of the
proceeds of his settlement, so to pay for living expenses, he obtained an
advance of $20,000 from LawCash.142 He agreed to repay the money
plus interest of sixteen percent annually if and when he received the
settlement. 143 Nine months later, after receiving a settlement of $8.75
million, he repaid LawCash.'44
This case is not typical in either the size nor the certainty of the
award, but that makes it a particularly good example of the useful
service litigation finance firms provide to the low and moderate-income
community. Louima, with no assets but his pending case, was not going
to be able to receive a loan from a bank at a regulated rate, even though
he was going to become in short order a multi-millionaire. In the
139. See Blum, supra note 66.
140. Id.
141. See Merrill, supra note 131 at 1.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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meantime, while he waited for that settlement, he didn't have funds for
living expenses. Getting the money from LawCash at a rather high rate
of interest makes good financial and practical sense in his case. Who
benefits if such a plaintiff does not have enough money for basic living
expenses? Only the defendants benefit, whether or not they are in the
right in the underlying case.
D. Litigaation Financing and Tort Reform
Business defendants have been making great headway in recent
years in getting the pendulum of tort law to swing in their direction.
145
Very cleverly, they have used the term "tort reform" to refer to their
efforts to make it harder for tort plaintiffs to win cases and, when they
do win, to receive awards that fully compensate them for their injuries
and adequately punish defendants for egregious acts. 146 Among their
successes in various states have been limiting the potential medical
malpractice liability of health care providers; eliminating joint and
several liability; imposing caps on non-economic damages, particularly
punitive damages; permitting structured settlements; and mandating
alternative forms of dispute resolution. 147  Discouraging litigation
financing is but one more example of business defendants' attempts to
"reform" tort law, that is, to rig the game so that plaintiffs have to forfeit
before they have their full and fair day on the playing field.
There are many examples of business defendants using delaying
tactics to the detriment of individual plaintiffs. Scribner v. AIU
Insurance Company148 is a very typical example in which the plaintiff
suffered personal injuries when he was a passenger in a vehicle that was
involved in an accident that occurred on March 20, 1987.149 On August
20, 1989 the plaintiff offered to settle the case for the insurance policy
145. See, e.g., Timothy D. Howell, So Long "Sweetheart-"-State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Gandy Swings the Pendulum Further to the Right as the Latest in a Line
of Setbacks for Texas Plaintiffs, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 47, 49-50 (1997). See generally
Note, "Common Sense " Legislation: The Birth of Neoclassical Tort Reform, 109 HARV.
L. REv. 1765 (1996).
146. See generally, id.
147. See id. at 1768.
148. 647 A.2d 48 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994).
149. Id. at 49.
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limit, but AIU refused 50 Later that month the plaintiff demanded that
AIU proceed with arbitration on his claim for underinsured motorist
coverage because the limits of all liability insurance policies had been
exhausted without his being fully compensated, and again AIU
refused. 1' In September 1989, the court ordered AIU to proceed with
arbitration which did not commence until December 1991, and then
"due to the defendants' delaying tactics" continued until September
1992.152 In October 1992, more than five and a half years after the
accident, AIU finally paid the policy limit amount of $200,000.' The
court noted that for years "the plaintiff requested repeatedly that his
claim be processed diligently and promptly and that he be paid the
amount of the policy limit.... The defendants. . . , however, refused to
cooperate and delayed the resolution of the plaintiffs claim."' 54 In a
follow-up action against AIU for violating the Connecticut Unfair Trade
Practices Act, the court awarded the plaintiff $450,000 in punitive
damages because "the defendants' actions clearly indicate a reckless
indifference to the rights of the plaintiff and an intentional and wanton
violation of those rights."' 55
A plaintiff who suffered injuries like those of Scribner (which
included a regression of a preexisting ataxia condition that caused
blurred vision, uncontrollable shaking of his head, twitching and shaking
of his arms and knees, and an adverse affect on his speech, eating,
walking, sitting, and driving) 56 might not have been able to work and,
therefore, not have been able to afford to pursue litigation for five and
half years. Traditional lenders would not advance him the money he
might need for living and medical expenses based on his interest in his
lawsuit. Under those circumstances, the delaying tactics would work
and would force him to accept an unfairly low offer from the defendant.
Litigation finance firms can help such plaintiffs withstand these tactics.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Scribner v. AIU Ins. Co., 1997 WL 793513, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997).
156. Scribner v. AIU Ins. Co., 1997 WL 793515, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Litigation financing firms provide an option to plaintiffs with good
cases but with meager or no financial resources. As in other subprime
lending situations, such as automobile loans, home mortgage loans, and
rent-to-own stores, there are lenders who take advantage of their
plaintiffs/borrowers. The response to these unscrupulous individuals
should be to require them to be transparent in their business dealings and
to encourage competition so that customers who need their services will
have more and better choices. To regulate the litigation financing
industry out of business, whether through legislation or court decisions,
would merely substitute other businesses in positions of power, namely,
defendants in lawsuits, who could take advantage of plaintiffs who
cannot pay their living expenses or medical bills while they wait for the
conclusion of their litigation.
Disallowing third party support for litigation on the grounds of
champerty or usury does not serve the purpose for which those doctrines
were created. No one is going to invest in a frivolous lawsuit because
any money thus invested will be lost. Reputable firms will not insinuate
themselves between clients and their lawyers. Third party support may
prolong litigation, but that is a desirable effect if the alternative is to
force plaintiffs without financial resources to accept any low but quick
offer made by defendants. Usury laws, rather than protecting
plaintiffs/borrowers, limit their options if applied to litigation financing
because traditional lenders will not invest in litigation; they judge the
risk too great for the interest they are allowed to charge. Furthermore,
unlike borrowers in other situations who may not be able to understand
the financial agreements they are entering into, plaintiffs/borrowers have
lawyers to advise them. They do not have to seek out a lawyer or pay an
additional fee because the financing agreement is directly related to the
case for which the lawyer has already been retained.
By leveling the playing field, litigation financing supports a tort
system that deters negligence and encourages a corporate interest in
safety. 157  It should be regulated to eliminate unscrupulous
entrepreneurs, but not to eliminate the industry and the options it offers
that are not otherwise available.
157. See generally Paul R. Sugarman & Valerie A. Yarashus, If You Like Enron,
You'll Love Tort Reform, 46 BOSTON BAR J. 26, at 26-27.
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